PARTIAL DEFENSE OF ‘RORTYANISM’ AGAINST SOME CLAIMS OF RELATIVISM AND SUBJECTIVISM

Autores/as

  • Wanderley Dias da Silva UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.37782/thaumazein.v14i27.3882

Resumen

Richard Rorty’s critics often considered him a relativist and a subjectivist, but he should be described as a particular type of sceptic: an ironist. The accusations of relativism and subjectivism only apply to Rorty’s philosophy if we evaluate it through the lenses of the very perspective he seeks to reject - a path a bit senseless to be taken. To illustrate, I will consider - and comment on - some of the criticisms raised against Rorty by Hilary Putnam. The task is, then, to rehearse a partial defense of Rortyan ironic pragmatism. There is intrinsic value in the sort of philosophical irony Rorty stood for. Yet, this notion of irony is the same that leads Rorty to reduce philosophy to a mere literary genre, and this is not without its contradictions. My doubt is whether, in the end, Rorty’s reduction of the role of philosophy is self-refuting.

Biografía del autor/a

Wanderley Dias da Silva, UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

Departamento de Filosofia, Doutoramento.

Descargas

Publicado

2021-08-30

Cómo citar

Dias da Silva, W. (2021). PARTIAL DEFENSE OF ‘RORTYANISM’ AGAINST SOME CLAIMS OF RELATIVISM AND SUBJECTIVISM. Thaumazein: Revista Online De Filosofia, 14(27), 45–65. https://doi.org/10.37782/thaumazein.v14i27.3882

Número

Sección

Artigos