PARTIAL DEFENSE OF ‘RORTYANISM’ AGAINST SOME CLAIMS OF RELATIVISM AND SUBJECTIVISM

Abstract

Richard Rorty’s critics often considered him a relativist and a subjectivist, but he should be described as a particular type of sceptic: an ironist. The accusations of relativism and subjectivism only apply to Rorty’s philosophy if we evaluate it through the lenses of the very perspective he seeks to reject - a path a bit senseless to be taken. To illustrate, I will consider - and comment on - some of the criticisms raised against Rorty by Hilary Putnam. The task is, then, to rehearse a partial defense of Rortyan ironic pragmatism. There is intrinsic value in the sort of philosophical irony Rorty stood for. Yet, this notion of irony is the same that leads Rorty to reduce philosophy to a mere literary genre, and this is not without its contradictions. My doubt is whether, in the end, Rorty’s reduction of the role of philosophy is self-refuting.