INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION

Abstract

In this brief article, I aim to identify and systematize the main problems, topics, concepts, and central notions presented by Peter Lipton in his account of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), as developed in his well-known essay “Inference to the Best Explanation” (2000), which has become a fundamental reference in contemporary debates on ampliative reasoning and scientific explanation. My focus lies primarily on two key problems traditionally associated with inductive reasoning, namely, the problem of description and the problem of justification. The former concerns IBE’s ability to adequately describe how, in fact, much of our inductive reasoning is carried out in scientific practice, whereas the latter concerns the possibility of rationally justifying such inferences, that is, of explaining why the choice of the best explanation would be epistemically legitimate. On this basis, I examine the relationship between IBE and Scientific Realism, with particular attention to the miracle argument-or, alternatively, the no-miracles argument-and its philosophical implications.