RECOGNITION OF THE OTHER IN LEVINASIAN PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

This article aims to present and respond to a relevant paradox found in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. The paradox arises from the problem of justice that is presented by Levinas (1961 [2011]; 1987 [1978]) in Totality and Infinity and in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. In the first work, the philosopher understands that justice is a term related to ethics, describing the encounter with the Face, as well as the ethical relationship irreducible to totality. In this work, the philosopher defends the unlimited responsibility of the Self (I) for the Other. In the second work, for Levinas, there is subjectivity exposed and traversed by the Other, as a subject constituted in the world that will have difficulty responding to all the appeals that face it, in an unlimited way. Therefore, in this work, justice ends up being discussed from the entry of the third party into the dual face-to-face relationship. Therefore, in an attempt to respond to this paradox, the term altruistic recognition, which Levinas scholars call altruistic recognition, was used at first, while at the same time there is a concern to compare this conception with the understanding of Hegel (1807[2008]) and Honneth (2009), after all, these philosophers also worked, each in their own way, with the theme of recognition. Afterwards, in a second moment, it was decided to describe and present three stages to altruistic recognition based on Levinasian philosophy with the aim of advancing discussions on recognition in this philosopher.