INTENCIONALIDADE E CONSCIÊNCIA COMO OS DOIS LADOS DA MESMA MOEDA
Resumo
Resumo: Neste artigo negamos a autonomia que o mainstream da filosofia da mente alega existir entre a intencionalidade e a consciência fenomênica. Afinal, enquanto a intencionalidade é considerada como a "sobredade" dos estados mentais, a consciência fenomenal é entendida como a aquilo que Nagel (1974) chamou de "o que é como" ser tal organismo consciente. De modo que se a consciência não pode explicar a intencionalidade, tão pouco a intencionalidade pode explicar a consciência. Entretanto, aqui desafiamos esta visão defendendo que estados intencionais dependem de um tipo mais fundamental de intencionalidade, a saber, a intencionalidade fenomenal, que é constituída pelo caráter fenomenal da experiência (consciência fenomênica). Apresentamos dois argumentos embasados na intencionalidade fenomenal para negar a suposta separação entre estas principais características da mentalidade.
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