

## THE SCOTIST LOGIC OF JERÓNIMO VALERA O.F.M. (1568–1625): LOGIC OF CATEGORIES OR TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC?

A LÓGICA SCOTISTA DE JERÓNIMO VALERA O.F.M. (1568–1625):  
 LÓGICA DAS CATEGORIAS OU LÓGICA TRANSCENDENTAL?

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### Abstract

*In this study, I make the attempt of illustrating two aspects on which Jerónimo Valera O.F.M. (1568–1625) introduces, inside his *Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam* (1610), logical-metaphysical themes that extrapolate the explicit contents of Scotus's works about logic. I have in view both the concepts of “infinite being” and “infinity” and a given account of categorial quantity and its properties. The focus of textual analysis are some Questions of the *Liber Secundus in quo praedicamenta Aristotelis Stagiritae expendantur*, i.e. the third and last part of the volume written by Jerónimo Valera. For the first aspect, Valera reveal a fine capacity of distinguishing kinds of infinity and the ways how categorial logic and transcendental logic must consider such a notion. Moreover, his view on categorial quantity depends on his assumption of the mystery of the eucharisty, what led him to emphasize and rationally defend the conceivability of some particular and fundamental properties of extensive quantity.*

**Keywords:** *Jerónimo Valera, John Duns Scotus, logic, metaphysics, infinite being, quantity.*

### Resumo

Neste estudo, faço a tentativa de ilustrar dois aspectos sobre os quais Jerónimo Valera O.F.M. (1568–1625) introduz, dentro dos seus *Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam* (1610), temas lógico-metafísicos que extrapolam os conteúdos explícitos das obras de Scotus sobre lógica. Tenho em vista tanto os conceitos de “ente infinito” e “infinitude” quanto o relato sobre a quantidade categórica e as suas propriedades. O foco da análise textual são algumas Questões do *Liber Secundus in quo praedicamenta Aristotelis Stagiritae expendantur*, ou seja, a terceira e última parte do volume escrito por Jerónimo Valera. Quanto ao primeiro aspecto, Valera revela uma grande capacidade de distinguir tipos de infinitude e os modos como a lógica categórica e a lógica transcendental devem tomar em consideração tal noção. Além disso, a sua concepção da quantidade categórica depende da sua assunção do mistério da eucaristia, que o levou a enfatizar e defender racionalmente a concebibilidade de algumas propriedades particulares e fundamentais da quantidade extensiva.

**Palavras-chave:** Jerónimo Valera, João Duns Scotus, lógica, metafísica, ente infinito, quantidade.

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## SHORT INTRODUCTION<sup>2</sup>

The work of the Peruvian Franciscan Master, Jerónimo Valera (1568–1625), that came to our days, namely *Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam* (1610), was the first philosophical book printed in South America (in Lima). It was prepared on the basis of classes of logic – initially at least at the Convento de San Francisco, in the same “Ciudad de los Reyes” – as a part of a *cursus philosophicus* for Franciscan friars. It should be viewed as an example of the literature on logic of those times and especially of the scholasticism practiced in Latin America as well; after all, giving continuity to both the tradition of writing *Summulae* – whose most obvious, although not rigorously followed, ancestor would be the *Tractatus* by Peter of Spain<sup>3</sup> – and commentaries to Aristotle’s *organon*, Valera’s volume touches both “minor” and “maior” logic<sup>4</sup>. The volume should contain three parts: *Summulae dialecticae*, *Liber Primus* and *Liber Secundus*, where the structure of the *Liber Primus* is taken from the *Quaestiones in Librum Porphyrii Isagoge* and of the *Liber Secundus* from the *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* – i.e. from two authentic works by John Duns Scotus, even though they were read by Valera by means of pre-critical editions – in particular editions previous to Luke Wadding’s 1639 edition of the *Opera* of Scotus<sup>5</sup>. Valera writes explicitly and intentionally a *logica in via Scoti*. However, if Valera is guided initially by John Duns Scotus’s *logicalia*, we should note that such a Scotist logic was significantly expanded by him, for he has the privilege of studying the points of view offered by the extant of the *corpus scoticum*<sup>6</sup> in order

<sup>2</sup> The content of this article has been previously presented in Subdivisions I and II of PICH, R. H., Jerónimo Valera (1568–1625) sobre ente infinito, infinitude e quantidade, in: D’AMICO, Claudia y TURSI, Antonio (orgs.), **Studium Philosophiae: Textos en homenaje a Silvia Magnavacca**, Buenos Aires: Editorial Rthesis, 2014, p. 243-263 (especialmente p. 244-258). Though following closely the textual version of that study, the present article corrects several aspects of Subdivision I, provides a more complete information and use of the textual sources by Jerónimo Valera, and sharpens the distinct features of Valera’s introduction of aspects of a transcendental logic and the nature of categorial quantity.

<sup>3</sup> On the late tradition of the *Summulae*, cfr., for example, ASHWORTH, E. J., **Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period**, Dordrecht – Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974, p. 19-20; ASHWORTH, E. J., Changes in Logic Textbooks from 1500 to 1650: The New Aristotelianism, in: KESSLER, E. – LOHR, Ch. H. – SPAM, W. (Hrsg.), **Aristotelismus und Renaissance. In Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt**, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988, p. 75-87.

<sup>4</sup> Cfr. REDMOND, W. B., Latin America, Colonial Thought in, in: CRAIG, E. (ed.), **The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy**, London – New York: Routledge, Vol. 5, 1998, p. 421ff.; RESTREPO, L. F., Colonial Thought, NUCCETELLI, S. – SCHUTTE, O. – BUENO, O. (eds.), **A Companion to Latin American Philosophy**, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 36-37; PICH, R. H., Recepção e desenvolvimento da Escolástica Barroca na América Latina, séculos 16-18: notas sobre a contribuição de Walter Bernard Redmond, **Scripta Mediaevalia**, Mendoza (Argentina), v. 4, n. 2, p. 1-22, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, **Opera omnia**, ed. WADDING, L., 12 Vols., Lyon, 1639 [reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968–1969].

<sup>6</sup> Cfr., for example, HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii ac quaestiones in universam Aristotelis ac Subtilissimi Doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti logicam**, Lima: Apud Franciscum a Canto, 1610, *Liber Primus de introductione ad logicam Aristotelis; Liber Secundus in quo praedicamenta Aristotelis Stagiritae expenduntur*; I d. 1 q. 3 p. 8; I d. 2 a. 1 q. 6 p. 48-49; I d. 2 a. 2 q. 6 p. 70-71; I d. 3 a. 1 q. 4 p. 111-112; II d. 2 q. 1 p. 217; II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244-245; II d. 4 q. 4 p. 261; II d. 4 q. 9 p. 277-278; II d. 5 a. 2 q. 2 p. 299; II d. 5 a. 2 q. 6 p. 316; II d. 6 q. 2 p. 353; II d. 7 q. 2 p. 370-371.

to write about a quite large range of logical matters<sup>7</sup>.

In this study, I make the attempt of illustrating two aspects on which Valera introduces logical-metaphysical themes that extrapolate the explicit contents of Scotus's works about logic. I have in view both the concepts of "infinite being" and "infinity" and a given account of categorial quantity and its properties. The focus of textual analysis are some Questions of the *Liber Secundus in quo praedicamenta Aristotelis Stagiritae expenduntur*, i.e. the third and last part of the volume written by Jerónimo Valera. After exposing which kinds of determinations of reality we find within the universe of Aristotelian categories, where the limits for a discourse on the "infinite being" are put in evidence (I), I will expose Valera's account of kinds of "infinity" (II), as well as one presupposition for his understanding of the predicament of "quantity", i.e. some metaphysical assumptions depending on the mystery of the eucharist (III), what shall be enough to offer a preliminary report of his views on the properties of "quantity".

## I. ON THE PREDICAMENTAL LINE

In the *Liber secundus*, Distinction IV, Question 2, it is asked "Which things should be put into the categories" or the "common classes of things" (*communes rerum classes*)<sup>8</sup>. This is above all a question about determining whether all things that *are* or at least *can be thought* – finite beings, infinite being(s), real beings, beings of reason, negations, etc. – have somehow a place within the categories. Things can be within the categories either "directly" or "indirectly and reductively". "Directly" within them are things that have adequately a seat in the "straight predicamental line": they are "directly and *per se*" under the supreme *genus* of "substance", just like "man, living being [*animal*]", etc. "Indirectly" within the categories are the "accidents", i.e. things that only have a place in the predicaments because they are something of *the things* that "directly and *per se*" are under the supreme *genus* of "substance"<sup>9</sup>. They have inadequately a seat in the "straight predicamental line". Moreover, the "straight predicamental

<sup>7</sup> Cfr., for example, the treatments offered by Valera of topics such as "common nature", "real being" and "being of reason", "substance", "quantity" and "relation", in HYERONIMUS VALERA, op. cit., 1610, I d. 2 a. 1 p. 34-53; I d. 1 p. 8-17 and I d. 2 a. 2 p. 52-59; II d. 3 p. 227-242; II d. 4 p. 242-280; II d. 5 p. 280-347. On Jerónimo Valera, cfr. CÉSPEDES AGÜERO, V. S., *La filosofía escotista de Jerónimo de Valera (1568–1625)*, in: BALLÓN VARGAS, J. C. (ed. y coord.), **La complicada historia del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII (Selección de textos, notas y estudios)**, Lima: Universidad Científica del Sur – Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos / Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico, 2011, p. 435-514; PICH, R. H., *Notas sobre Jerónimo Valera e suas obras sobre lógicas*, **Cauriensia**, Cáceres, v. 6, p. 169-202, 2011; PICH, R. H., *Scholastica colonialis: Notes on Jerónimo Valera's (1568-1625) Life, Work, and Logic*, **Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale**, Turnhout, v. 54, p. 65-107, 2012.

<sup>8</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 (*quae ponantur in praedicamentis*): "Decem esse rerum praedicamenta, veluti quasdam communes rerum classes, sedes, ac domicilia, omniumve elementorum disserendi seminaria, in praecedenti controversia statutum est: reliquum est ut dispiciamus, num omnia quo quomodo sunt, aut cogitari possunt, sive perfecta sive imperfecta, et aliorum partes, aut modi, sive entia sive entium negationes, sive finita, infinitave, sive realia sive rationis, in Praedicamentis locum habeant".

<sup>9</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 216 [sive p. 218].

line” of substance supports a division that has place “through two opposite differences” – such as “incorporeal substance” and “corporeal substance” – which can be subdivided again<sup>10</sup>.

Which are the things that are to be found within the straight predicamental line? Within the categories we find only “being”: a being that has essence divides into ten categories. “Ens”, here, is taken “nominally” and “substantively”: it means “essence”. It is not taken “as a particip” or “adjectively”, meaning formally “existence” – which is not “within” the predicaments<sup>11</sup>. “Non beings” (*non entia*), namely “negations”, “privations”, “impossible things”, “chimerical things”, “imaginary things” and “fictional things”, just because they have no essence, cannot possibly be part of or stay under any category<sup>12</sup>. Following Aristotle, the Scotist Jerónimo Valera accepts that within the predicaments are inserted only “real beings” (*entia realia*). “Beings of reason” (*entia rationis*) are only “shadows of being” (*entis umbrae*), and therefore they are not properly real and do not agree with real being through any univocal concept<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, in the predicaments only beings “*per se* and *incomplex*” have place. So, we exclude from the categories “complex beings” such as a “being by accident” (*the composite or combination of several predicaments such as “white man”*) or “definitions”, which are *composed* by parts that equally are “beings *per se*” or belong as *genus* and specific difference to the same predicament (i.e. “substance”). Moreover, in the categories themselves we find only univocal items, which are taken as “universal predicates” (*praedicata universalia*). “Individuals” (*individua*) – understood as it seems in strict opposition to universal predicates based on the reality of the thing, that is, as unities with numerical identity – and equivocal items are also outside the categories<sup>14</sup>.

In a first conclusion Valera affirms, thus, that only “complete beings” are to be found in the straight predicamental line. A “complete” being is not a “composite” being of any sort of parts – (i)

<sup>10</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 216 [sive p. 218]. Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 218: Sic ex eodem summo genere per duas differentias oppositas diviso, duo genera propagantur, quae rursus per alias divisa, duas lineas inadaequatas conficiunt, unam adaequatam constituentes”.

<sup>11</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 218: “Certum est, entia sola in praedicamentis collocari, cum ens habens scilicet essentiam fit, quod in decem genera dividitur, ea ergo quae nullam essentiam habent, species aut individua summi generis esse nequeunt. Sumimus autem in praesenti ens nominaliter et substantive ut essentiam significat, non vero participialiter seu adiective ut est participium verbi (est) et idem quod existens, ipsam existentiam formaliter importans, cum Praedicamenta illam non includant, ut ex eorum diffinitionibus liquet et ex. Phylosopho. 2 post. tex. 9”.

<sup>12</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 218-219: “Unde a praedicamentis excluduntur non entia, ut negationes et Privationes et etiam impossibilia, et chimerica, et commentitia, conficta quidem ex possibilibus, sed quiquae simul cohaerere non possunt, cum ista veram essentiam non habeant”.

<sup>13</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 219: “Sola entia realia in Praedicamentis collocari omnes quoque recipiunt; (solo Buridano excepto qui relationes rationis in Praedicamento relationis constituit) quia ens reale est quod in haec decem Praedicamenta secundum Aristotelem dividitur. Unde entia rationis merito reiiciuntur a Praedicamentis, cum non entia sed entis umbrae sint, nec univoce conveniant in aliquo genere cum ente reali, non ergo possunt sub eodem genere Praedicamenti contineri”.

<sup>14</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 219: “Certum etiam est sola univoca in praedicamentis collocari, intellige de praedicatis, quod propter individua dictum puta, quae non ponuntur ut praedicata universalia atque adeo ut univoca in praedicamentis, unde aequivoca reiiciuntur, ut procul abigatur Praedicamentorum confusio”.

“physical”, (ii) “metaphysical” or (iii) “integral”<sup>15</sup>. As a matter of fact, Valera judges that the notion of “complete being” can be explained easily through the notion of “individual” (*individuum*), a thing that has every complement of it “inside its own genus”<sup>16</sup>. Being opposite to a “compositum”, a complete being is taken, thus, as a typological and really distinguishable aspect of an individual thing, which is classifiable either as a substantial or as an accidental item. “Categories” as “complete beings” keep in themselves that ultimate aspect of being objective and logical *non mixed* real types.

Truly, “substance” as the supreme *genus*, is “complete” and contains “the *ratio* of complete predicates”: being an entity that says negation of “parts” of any sort and “formalities” that are in themselves incomplete. Moreover, *genera* and *species* as real types are “directly and *per se*” within the categories, and they are rightly conceived not insofar as they are signified by *abstract names* such as “animality” and “humanity”, but insofar as they are signified by *concrete names* such as “animal” and “man”<sup>17</sup>. According to what was premised about categories, “differences” (*differentiae*) must be rejected from the straight predicamental line. After all, “supreme *genera*” are not predicated “directly and essentially” of “differences”. In fact, categories as supreme *genera* are “outside the formal reason” of the differences. As a consequence, we have to assume that any *differentia* “is always, is conceived and is signified just as a part”<sup>18</sup>.

## II. ON THE INFINITE BEING

It is in the second conclusion of the *Commentarii...* II d. 2 q. 2 that Valera focuses on the place of the “absolutely infinite being, which is God”, within the categories. Uncontroversially, he affirms that such a being is neither directly nor indirectly included in the predicaments. He refers to Scotus’s *Ordinatio* I d. 8<sup>19</sup>. In his logical textbook, the intriguing treatment of “infinity” by Valera begins here. And, to begin with, some distinctions are welcome, for the “infinite is triple”: (1) there is the infinite “absolutely” (*simpliciter*), which contains “every possible perfection formally or eminently”, and whose essence is “illimited”. Under these conditions,

<sup>15</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 2 q. 2 p. 219. Cfr. also IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, in: **Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera philosophica I**, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) – Washington, D.C.: The Franciscan Institute Publications, 1999, q. 15 (*An partes substantiae sint substantiae*) n. 10 p. 385-386.

<sup>16</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 2 q. 2 p. 219-220. Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 219-220: “[...] illa vero ut quid incompletum removetur: id ergo per individuum commodius explicare posse arbitror solum enim in eo esse completum simpliciter reperiri posset, ac proinde eorum genera et species illud ergo individuum est ens simpliciter et absolute completum, quod omne suum complementum habet intra proprium genus requisitum, per negationes autem exactius sic explicatur, quod ad nullius entis per se seu unius essentiae constitutionem ex sua natura ordinatur, nec actu unum per se constituit, [...]”.

<sup>17</sup> Valera refers to *Commentarii...* I d. 2 a. 3 q. 4 p. 84-87 (especially p. 86). Cfr. also HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 2 q. 2 p. 220-221.

<sup>18</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 2 q. 2 p. 221: “Deducitur tertio differentias esse a recta linea reiiciendas, cum de illis genera suprema non praedicentur directe et essentialiter, cum extra rationem formalem illarum sint, ut supra ostensum est, quod si genus de differentia in concreto essentialiter praedicatur, hoc tantum est ratione abstracti, quod veluti connotat, non vero formaliter ratione scilicet significati formalis. Unde ratione huius semper est, et concipitur, et significatur ut pars”.

<sup>19</sup> Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* I, in: **Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia IV: Ordinatio – Liber primus: a distinctione quarta ad decimam**, Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1956, d. 8 p. 1 q. 1-4.



God alone is infinite. (2) There is a second infinite *simpliciter*, i.e. the infinite “in a *genus*”, namely one that is in essence “illimited”; although such an *infinitum* does not possess “formally and precisely” “every possible perfection”, it has “according to a *ratio* and a *genus*” what Valera calls “essential infinite perfection” (*infinita perfectio essentialis*). In these terms, “divine attributes” are infinite: “divine wisdom” is not formally “divine justice”, but its “latitude” is in itself of “infinite perfection” and identical with God Himself<sup>20</sup>. (3) Finally, there is the infinite “in a qualified sense” (*secundum quid*). Its essence is *simpliciter* finite, but it acquires “illimitation” through an “accidental” element. For example, the “line” (when deprived of the indivisible term-limit) is (in potency) infinite “in extension”; moreover, the “whiteness” is (also in potency) infinite “in intensity”<sup>21</sup>.

The conclusion, that God, the infinite being, has no place inside the predicamental line, is proved initially through the concept of “infinity” itself. After all, there is in that concept no “composition of *genus* and difference”. Truly, Valera seems to speak, here, of ontological simplicity. And in fact *any entity* under the predicaments – we should understand here a particular entity or a particular real being – falls into composition. To be put “directly” into a category implies to possess other elements by reason of which that first is determined “to proper being”. In such things we do not find a *genus* without a “superadded being” – namely, a given (external) “difference”. A similar conclusion applies to the concept of “necessary being”: if it has a *genus* (in this case, “being”), it is “of itself” (*ex se*) necessary or not. Focusing on what is more relevant in order to understand the simplicity of a being, we are told by Valera that, if that necessary being is of itself necessary, then it *includes* the “difference” (that is, “necessary”), for without it it is not in “ultimate actuality”; but, what is *of itself* “necessary being” is in “ultimate actuality”, and precisely in that way “the *genus* is not *genus*”, for the *genus* (taken in categorial sense) *does not include* any given differences through which it is divided<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> In those two first meanings of “infinite”, we could see some influence of Valera on one of his possible disciples, namely Alfonso Briceño (1568–1625); cfr. PICH, R. H., Alfonso Briceño (1587-1668) and the *Controversiae* on John Duns Scotus’s Philosophical Theology: The Case of Infinity, **Modern Schoolman**, Saint Louis, v. 89, p. 65–94, 2012.

<sup>21</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 221: “Praenosceret oportet, triplex esse infinitum, unum simpliciter, omnem perfectionem possibilem formaliter vel eminenter continens, atque adeo illimitatam habens essentiam, quo pacto solus Deus est infinitus, omnes namque res creatae essentiam habent certis finibus conclusam, unde simpliciter sunt finitae, Alterum est infinitum in aliquo genere, illud scilicet quod secundum suam essentiam est illimitatum, et licet formaliter ac praecise non habeat omnem perfectionem possibilem secundum tamen aliquam rationem, et genus, infinitam habet perfectionem essentialem, et identice est simpliciter infinitum, quo pacto sunt infinita attributa divina: ut sapientia divina licet formaliter non sit iustitia, intra latitudinem tamen Sapientiae infinitam habet perfectionem, et identice est ipse Deus, Alterum tandem est infinitum secundum quid, quod scilicet finitam simpliciter habet essentiam, secundum tamen aliquod accidens illimitationem habet, ut si daretur linea infinitam habens extensionem, et albedo infinite intensa”; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, **Ordinatio** I d. 8 q. 3 n. 117-119; n. 108 e 138. Cfr. also KING, P., Scotus on Metaphysics, in: WILLIAMS, Th. (ed.), **The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 25-26, 32-33.

<sup>22</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 221: “Probat conclusionem noster Doctor dupliciter. Primo ex ratione infinitatis, quia cum illa non stat compositio ex genere et differentia, [...] [...] quod enim sub aliquo genere directe ponitur in Praedicamento, praeter illud habet aliud ex vi cuius illud ad proprium esse determinatur, alioquin genus sine esse superaddito daretur in rebus, et illud sane differentia est. Secundo ex ratione necesse esse. Si necesse esse habet genus, vel ergo illud genus est ex se necesse esse vel non. Si primum, ergo includit differentiam, quia sine illa non est in ultimo actu, id autem quod necesse est esse, ex se est in ultimo actu, atque adeo genus non est genus, cum hoc non includat differentias per quas dividitur. [...]”.

Short after that, Valera stresses an important Scotist thesis on predicamental and metaphysical concepts, i.e. that *genus, by nature and necessarily*, “includes finity”<sup>23</sup>. It can never possibly be understood as indifferent to finity and infinity. It belongs to a categorial *genus* to be “an imperfect and potential determinable nature”. Differences that are added to it (and specify it) are perfections. A concept indifferent to such differences proper to generic-categorial concepts and that can be predicated in common of God and creatures *has to be* indifferent to finite and infinite or, making use of the expressions of Valera himself, at least to “finite” and “non-finite” – keeping in perspective that “divine relations” are neither “finite” nor “infinite”, which is by the way a thesis of Scotus in his *Quodlibet V*<sup>24</sup> and developed by the Chilean Scotist, one generation after Valera, i.e. Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668)<sup>25</sup>. If every *genus* is determinable through a “difference”, that means that it is determinable to finity and limitation, because a difference is a “finite and limited degree”. Between *genus* and difference “one demands a potential and finite suitability”, but nothing of that happens in God or the “infinite being”<sup>26</sup>. Thus, if the concept of categorial *genus* supports indifference to opposites, it is always a type determinable by finite opposites; the concept of being, which admits indifference to opposites as well, is not necessarily determinable by a finite opposite: therefore, it extrapolates the categorial dimension.

Valera accepts that the third type of infinite, the infinite *secundum quid*, has a place within the categories: it can be said of things of “finite and limited essence” *simpliciter*. He explores the axiom that it does not follow from the highest in one type of *inferior* being the existence of the highest in one type of *superior* being. Again: we cannot conclude the highest in the reason of being from something perfect in the highest way that is contained within a category. “Quantity”, as any other *genus*, is not a “most perfect” *simpliciter* in the reason of being – for any category is limited in essence. Thus, it does not follow “most perfect quantity; therefore, most perfect being”. For that reason, if one supposes an infinite “in quantity”, it does not follow an “infinite being *simpliciter*” in essence, but only an infinite being “in a qualified sense”<sup>27</sup>. Truly, when infinity *secundum quid* is said of any given *genus*, it does not

<sup>23</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 221.

<sup>24</sup> Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quodlibet V*, in: JUAN DUNS ESCOTO, **Cuestiones Cuodlibetales**, edicion bilingüe, Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968, a. 2 p. 174-198.

<sup>25</sup> Cfr. ALFONSO BRICEÑO, **Prima Pars Celebriorum Controversiarum in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti Doctoris Subtilis**, Madrid: Typographia Regia, 1639 (1642), *Controversia V* a. 3 n. 21-30 p. 276-278.

<sup>26</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 221: “[...], quia natura generica necessario finitatem includit unde non potest intelligi indifferens ad finitatem et infinitatem, eo quod de ratione generis sit esse naturam determinabilem imperfectam et potentialem, quae perfectione addita per differentias vincitur a suis speciebus, conceptus ergo indifferens ad aliqua ad quae non potest esse conceptus generis indifferens, nequit esse conceptus generis, at quidquid dicitur communiter de Deo et creaturis indifferens est ad finitum et infinitum, loquendo de perfectionibus absolutis, vel saltim ad finitum et non finitum, loquendo etiam de relationibus, relatio enim divina nec est finita nec infinita. Differentia autem gradus quidam est finitus et limitatus, genus trahens ad quemdam essendi modum particularem, distinctum ab alio, qui ab alia differentia communicatur, quia ergo ad genus et differentiam requiritur convenientia potentialis et finita, et distinctio finita et limita[ta] ideo in deo non reperiuntur”.

<sup>27</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 2 q. 2 p. 221-222. Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 222: “Quantitas autem nec aliquod aliud genus non est simpliciter perfectissimum sub ente, cum quodlibet sit in essentia limitatum, imo nihil potest esse tale simpliciter nempe perfectissimum in essentia, nisi quod est perfectio simpliciter, quod ex se infinitum potest esse, et ideo non sequitur perfectissima quantitas, ergo perfectissimum ens, nec ex infinito in quantitate, sequitur ens simpliciter infinitum in essentia, sed tantum secundum quid, et limitatum ens simpliciter”.

ascribe potentiality to it, but infinity “of something imperfect in entity”. Accordingly, the “line” can be both finite and infinite; in both cases it is just a “longitude without latitude” – if it is infinite (and surely such an infinite would be only in extensive quantity), then, because of the limitation of the essence of the line, there would be only an infinity *secundum quid*<sup>28</sup>.

It is worth mentioning a further conclusion by Valera, namely that what is not “*per se* and directly” in the predicaments can have place there “reductively” on the basis of what is there *per se* – just like “parts” and “modes” (*modi* or *affectiones*). About this last type, Valera speaks of “existence”, “subsistence”, “inherence”, and “individual differences” not as predicaments, but incomplete *modi*. These modes “complete the individual in the proper *genus*” (substance or accident)<sup>29</sup>. Jerónimo Valera offers at least six examples of those reducible parts and *modi*: (a) composite “accidental beings” that refer to “beings *per se*”; (b) “beings of reason” that refer to “real beings”; (c) “incomplete beings” that refer to “complete beings”; (d) “complex beings” that refer to “incomplex beings”; (e) “negations” and “privations” that refer to negated and deprived things; (f) “imaginary beings” that refer to those things out of which they are created<sup>30</sup>.

Up to this point we can see that Valera relates “infinite” – understood with no further details as a “mode” that does not affect the formal aspect to which it attaches – to an essence or attributes which are capable of illimitation *and* incapable of intrinsic limitation (the divine essence and the pure perfections, for example); he relates “infinite”, in a qualified sense (or: in quantity), to something that is limited in essence, for example, the extension of the line or the quality of an intensive whiteness. Answering to the theoretical topic proposed in Book II d. 2 q. 2 of his *Commentarii...*, Valera emphasizes that a *genus* or even the supreme categorial type does not admit, by definition, as one of the “opposites” (or “differences”) to which it is indifferent, infinity understood as illimitation of ontological realization. Therefore, any given real concept which is indifferent to infinity *qua* strict illimitation is not, thus, a generic concept at all.

### III. ON QUANTITY

In fact, the explanation of “infinity” provided above gave already a hint that “quantity” is said in two different ways. In order to make it explicit, Valera indicates the texts of Scotus that were his sources: *Ordinatio I*

<sup>28</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 2 q. 2 p. 221-222. Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 222.

<sup>29</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 2 q. 2 p. 222: “[...], unde existentia, subsistentia, inhaerentia, differentiae individuales, non constituunt proprium praedicamentum, cum modi sint incompleti, sed reducuntur ad ea quorum sunt, quia praedicamenta sunt impermixta a summo genere usque ad individua, teste Aristotele. 1. poste. c. 11. tex. 31. [...]”.

<sup>30</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 2 q. 2 p. 222: “Entia per accidens ad Entia per se ex quibus constant. Entia rationis ad entia realia in quibus fundantur. Entia incompleta ad completa. Complexa ad incomplexa, Negationes et privationes ad ea quae negantur. Commentitia ad ea ex quibus constare finguntur. Omnia autem sive quae per se sive quae reductive in praedicamentis collocantur, ad Deum ut ad rerum omnium Principium et finem revocantur, tam longe enim abest ut ipse ad Praedicamentum reducat, cum hoc imperfectionem et incompletionem praeseferat”.



d. 19 q. un., *Ordinatio* I d. 31 q. un. and *Quodlibet* q. 6<sup>31</sup>. On those passages, (1) and as its first meaning, namely the “metaphorical” meaning of quantity, Valera finds the fundamental idea of “latitude of perfection”. This is a notion that comes from Augustine, who spoke of the “quantity” or “magnitude of perfection” of something<sup>32</sup>. Valera affirms that that quantity is proper to every “being” and “genus”, where “magnum et parvum”, in that “metaphorical sense” (*translative*) of the quantity of perfection, are “transcendentals”: they are respective, without any possible restriction, to every being. After all, there is no being without “latitude of perfection”. This same latitude says that one thing “excells” another and (or) “is excelled” by another. In the terms of that quantity of perfection, we see a proper metaphysical language consolidated, namely (being used with equivalent meanings) the expressions (a) “latitude of intensity” and (a) “quantity of intensity” of perfection<sup>33</sup>.

Interestingly enough, Valera explores with similar terms, i.e. keeping a discourse on “perfection”, “excelling” and “being excelled”, but applying them to other essential determinations, two further expressions of “latitude” or “quantity”: (b) there is also a “latitude of duration” or “quantity of duration”, including here the “indivisible duration”, which is doubtless a latitude of “eternity” or for example the “aevum” of angelic beings; (c) there is still in potencies (of action and, thus, of causation) the “latitude of efficacy” and of “perfection in acting”, that is, the “quantity of virtue” or “quantity of power”. Valera affirms that this quantity is found in every *genus* and outside of it as well, namely in divine being. Following Scotus, he calls it “metaphorical quantity” (*quantitas translative*) as well<sup>34</sup>. Although he does

<sup>31</sup> Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* I d. 19, in: **Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia V. Ordinatio – Liber primus: a distinctione undecima ad vigesimam quintam**, Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1959, q. 1 n. 8 p. 267; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* I d. 31, in: **Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia VI. Ordinatio – Liber primus: a distinctione vigesima sexta ad quadragesimam octavam**, Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963, q. un. n. 11-22 p. 207-214; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quodlibet* VI, in: JUAN DUNS ESCOTO, **Cuestiones Cuodlibetales**, edicion bilingüe, Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968, a. 1 n. 5-31; on Scotus fundamental texts to the construction of the concept of “infinite being”, cfr. PICH, R. H., Infinity and Intrinsic Mode, in: PICH, R. H. (ed.), **New Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens**, Louvain-la-Neuve: FIDEM – Brepols, 2007, p. 159-214.

<sup>32</sup> Cfr. HONNEFELDER, L., **Scientia transcendens – Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus – Suárez – Wolff – Kant – Peirce)**, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990, p. 109ff.; HONNEFELDER, L., **Duns Scotus**, München: Beck Verlag, 2005, Seção 3.4.3. Cfr. also PICH, R. H., **Der Begriff der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus**, Bonn: Universität Bonn, 2001, Section 4.3.

<sup>33</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244: “[...]. Dupliciter ergo accipitur quantitas ut probe adnotat noster Doctor in I d. 19 q. unica & d. 31 q. unica, et in *Quodlibet* q. 6. Primo metaphoricè pro quavis perfectionis latitudine quam D. Augustinus 6 *De Trinitate* c. 7 quantitatem seu magnitudinem perfectionis vocat et haec convenit omni ente cuiusque generis, et magnum et parvum translative sumpta transcendentia sunt respectu omnis entis, nulla etenim res est quae non habeat perfectionis latitudinem, secundum quam una excedit aliam et ab alia exceditur, quo pacto latitudinem intensionis, quantitatem intensionis, [...]”.

<sup>34</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244: “[...], et latitudinem durationis etiam indivisibilis, aevi nimirum Angelorum, quantitatem durationis, et in potentiis latitudinem efficacitatis et perfectionis in agendo quantitatem virtutis appellamus, imo non solum in omni genere, sed extra omne genus in Deo scilicet Optimo ac Maximo translative quantitas reperitur”. Cfr. also IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri I-V*, in: ANDREWS, R., et alii (eds.), **B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera philosophica III**, St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997, II q. 4-6 n. 20 pp. 244-245: “Quantitas omnis – proprie vel metaphoricè – est magnitudo vel multitudo, proprie vel metaphoricè. Ergo omnis infinitas talis est in magnitudine vel multitudine, propria vel metaphoricè”.

not offer details on the two last meanings of latitude or quantity, it is arguable that they indicate, in the case of an infinite measure, a derivative meaning that comes from illimitation of perfection and applies to *eternity* and *omnipotence*, where in none of the three senses any kind of quantitative extension is expressed. (2) Moreover, as the second type of quantity, and again according to an established Augustinian-Scotist terminology, our author mentions the “quantity of mass” (*quantitas mollis*), to be comprehended *only* as a kind of “accident” in material substances. It is not difficult to see that in Aristotelian categories, as well as in the logic that underlies them, only that last kind of quantity is considered. And it is important to distinguish this category as such – i.e. categorial *quantitas* – from the broader notion a “quantitative thing” (*res quanta*), i.e. further categorial types such as “substance” and “quality” or things and aspects of being that fall under them<sup>35</sup>.

It is important to highlight, at this point, an important consequence of Valera’s account of a Scotist theory of kinds of quantity, i.e. intensive and extensive. The quantity of intensity that every being has is a mode that is to be found necessarily in all things – leaving out of the discussion here the attribution of intensive quantity to the divine relations<sup>36</sup>. The quantity of mass is not coextensive to all beings: it is rather accidental to any being. Truly it is accidental even to categorial substance. Valera emphasizes, in order to establish two comparisons, that (i) categorial “quantity” is distinguished from “substance”, “quality” and remaining accidents – being all of them “quanta” because they are quantifiable through “quantity” – not only “formally *ex natura rei*”, but “really”<sup>37</sup>. This shows something important about predicaments: (i) first, it shows that “substance”, “quantity” (just like quality and the other categories) refer to several diverse predicaments; however, the predicaments (as a whole) are distinguished to each other (at least and only) through a “formal distinction”, according to “objective reasons” independent of the mind<sup>38</sup>. Moreover, the fact that (ii) “substance” and “quantity” are not

<sup>35</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244: “Secundo sumitur pressius ac proprie pro quantitate mollis, quae accidens quoddam est in sole re materiali repertum, quo redditur proprie quanta secundum mollem et corpulentiam, de hac ergo modo perquirimus, quo pacto distinguatur a re quanta, nimirum a substantia, Qualitate ac aliis accidentibus, quae quanta dicuntur”.

<sup>36</sup> On this topic, cfr. also PICH, R. H., Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre o conceito de infinitude: três debates scotistas fundamentais, in: CULLETON, Alfredo; STRECK, Lênio; REIS, Róbson Ramos dos (orgs.), **Festschrift [um tributo a Ernildo Stein] – Viveu às voltas com a metafísica e a fenomenologia**, São Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2015, p. 175-181 (p. 159-182).

<sup>37</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244: “Conclusio sit communi gravissimorum philosophorum theologorumque consensu recepta, quantitatem non solum formaliter ex natura rei, sed realiter quoque a substantia, qualitate, aliisque accidentibus quae ab illa quanta dicuntur accidentarie, distingui. Docet eam noster Doctor in 2 d. 2 q. 9 et 5 *Metaphysica* q. 9”. Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* II, in: **Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia VII – Ordinatio Liber secundus: a distictione prima ad tertiam**, Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1973, d. 2 p. 2 q. 5 (*Utrum angelus possit moveri de loco ad locum motu continuo*), referring perhaps to the contents of n. 332-353 p. 298-311; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, V q. 9 (*Utrum propria ratio quantitatis sit divisibilitas vel ratio mensurae*) n. 1-125 p. 527-560.

<sup>38</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244: “Prima pars sic ostenditur. Substantia et quantitas (et idem de qualitate et aliis) ad diversa spectant Praedicamenta, atqui Praedicamenta inter se distinctione formali secernuntur, nimirum secundum formalitates seu diffinitiones essentiales, rationesve obiectivas, seclusa mentis functione distinctas, alias enim secundum eandem formalitatem ad idem praedicamentum specterent”.

the same “formal entity”, this is something to be realized through the fundamental condition that, according to their nature each time, one (i.e. substance) has the “mode of being *per se*”, the other (i.e. quantity) has the “mode of inhering”. The differences between them can go further<sup>39</sup>: substance is not sensible *per se*, but only accidentally; quantity, however, is “through itself sensible”, and it is called the “common sensible”<sup>40</sup>.

The “real” distinction between quantity and substance, as well as between quantity and other accidents, is based on the “mysteries of faith”. An index of *real distinction* is this: when two things are separated, one remains and the other disappears, and that happens in each case because of the “intrinsic entity” of the items. Valera makes also the logical point that “the same” cannot be separated from itself<sup>41</sup>. In the eucharist, however, the entire substance of the bread disappears<sup>42</sup>, while its quantity remains in “its entire intrinsic entity”. In fact, according to the theologians, “all accidents of the bread” remain, while by supernatural means the substance disappears. In that case, “quantity” is the *subiectum* of all other accidents, otherwise they would be undone without any form of binding substrate. So, quantity and further accidents have no real identity with substance<sup>43</sup>. “Quantity” remains, because in fact the further accidents of the bread remain; moreover, their quantity is maintained and has identity with itself alone. If that explains the “real distinction” between quantity and substance, it also explains the real distinction between quantity and further accidents. After all, in the eucharist, after the (theologically presumed) destruction of the substance of the bread, the same quantity must be taken as the only “common subject” of the remaining union of accidents<sup>44</sup>.

It is undeniable that the “quantity” treated in commentaries to Aristotle’s categories is mainly extensive quantity. Valera focuses on the definition of that quantity in *Commentarii... II d. 4 q. 3* (“What is the formal reason of quantity?”). Referring to Aristotle in *Metaphysics V*, 13 and Scotus in *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis q. 18*, he reminds us that “the *quantum* is divisible”<sup>45</sup>. In two presuppositions (*notabilia*) about this issue, before offering a determination *ad mentem Scoti*, Valera will

<sup>39</sup> Cfr. on that issue PINI, G., **Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus – An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century**, Leiden – Boston – Köln: E. J. Brill, 2002, p. 142-144.

<sup>40</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii... II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244**.

<sup>41</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii... II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244**. Passagem importante.

<sup>42</sup> Valera follows explicitly the decrees of the Council of Trent on that issue. Cfr. ISERLOH, E., Abendmahl III/3, in: KRAUSE, G. und MÜLLER, G. (Hrsg.), **Theologische Realenzyklopädie**, Berlin – New York: Walter de Gruyter, Band I, 1977, p. 122-131.

<sup>43</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii... II d. 4 q. 1 p. 244-245**.

<sup>44</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii... II d. 4 q. 1 p. 245**: “Sicque praeccluditur effugium illud, ideo dici quantitatem panis manere, quia manent accidentia, quorum quodlibet suam habet propriam quantitatem secum identificata, et a substantia panis realiter distinctam: illud enim fundamentum non solum convincit realem distinctionem quantitatis a substantia sed et ab aliis accidentibus, ut commune illorum subiectum in quo uniuntur et sustentantur, [...]”.

<sup>45</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii... II d. 4 q. 3 p. 253**. Cfr. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysik*, in: SEIDL, H. (Hrsg.), **Aristoteles’ Metaphysik – Erster Halbband (Bücher I(A) - VI (E))**, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989, V 13; Valera mentions Question 18, but he would be probably referring to Questions 16 and 17; cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 16 (*Utrum quantitas sit genus*) et q. 17 (*Utrum quantitas sit genus unum*) n. 14, 23 p. 395, 397.

affirm (1) first that two major doubts have to be faced about the formal definition of quantity. On the one side, it is asked whether in “quantitative extension of parts”, either “in an order to itself” or “in an order to place”, the first property that should be attributed to a quantitative thing is – in the sense of exclusiveness – “divisibility”, “measurability” or “impenetrability”. The “first immediate [aspect]” would give *a priori*, as a definition, the “essence of quantity”, and the further aspects would hold as “properties” (*passiones*) of it – just like a “proprium”<sup>46</sup> that could be demonstrated, in an “order of nature”, from the “first, proper, intrinsic and formal cause”. On the other side, it happens that several aspects, in what concerns the quantity of any existing material thing, seem to be “common”: the “having parts” of a material thing, the “extensions of the parts” of a material thing, the “divisibility” of a material thing, etc. However, what really matters is the explanation of the reason why or the particular content that expresses exactly what is “first and *per se*” the nature of such quantity<sup>47</sup>.

(2) Second, and here Valera seeks an explicit support in Scotus – namely *Ordinatio* IV d. 10 q. 1<sup>48</sup> – “the extension of quantity” is “the ordered union of quantitative parts”, the reason why “one part is said [to be] outside the other”, where this “outside” (*extra*) is understood (i) either of the parts themselves (one is outside the other), (ii) or of the “place” (each part is outside “the place of the other”). This double meaning of the order of the quantitative parts helps to understand that extension itself is double, that is, (i) “in an order to itself or in an order to the whole” and (ii) “in an order to the place”, that is “local extension”. The first extension consists in an order – simply in terms of prior and posterior – of the quantitative parts “to the whole”, and that whole is the “permanent continuous quantitative whole”. The second extension, which presupposes the first, is understood in such a way that the quantitative parts, disposed in an order to the whole, are “spread out”, they are “coextensive to space and place”. As the “the entire space and place of the whole corresponds to quantity”, so the “parts of the place” correspond to the “parts of quantity”, where each quantitative part is outside the place of the other<sup>49</sup>. Of course, the first extension just explained does not presuppose the second extension.

<sup>46</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 4 q. 3 p. 254: “Ut autem nostram sententiam proferamus, observare primo oportet, duo esse quae rem hanc ancipitem et dubiam reddunt. Primum est, inter plura quae in quantitate reperiuntur, nimirum extensionem partium quantitativam, tam in ordinem ad se, quam in ordine ad locum, divisibilitatem, mensurabilitatem ac impenetrabilitatem, quae omnia substantiae tribuit (etenim cum forma quae vis totum suum esse subiecto communicet, tribuit quidquid ipsa in se habet) quid horum primum sit in quantitate pervestigare, quod si id consisterit, id illius essentia erit, caetera autem passionum ac proprietatum rationem obtinebunt, est enim certum apud omnes, primum conceptum immediatum rei, [...]”.

<sup>47</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 4 q. 3 p. 254-255. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 255: “Oportet ergo dilucidare quam peculiarem rationem importet, id quod ex his primo et per se naturam talis quantitatis stricte sumptae constituit, et essentialiter a rebus aliorum praedicamentorum distinguit, ne supervacaneae videatur, quod quia difficile est, non mirum si non ita facile quantitatis essentia explanari valeat”.

<sup>48</sup> Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* IV, in: **Ioannis Duns Scoti. Opera omnia VIII: Ordinatio IV d. 1 – Ordinatio IV d. 13**, ed. WADDING, L., Lyon, 1639 [reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968], d. 10 q. 1 (*Utrum possibile sit corpus Christi sub specie panis, et vini realiter contineri?*) n. 1-17 p. 487-598; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* IV, in: **Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia XII – Liber quartus: a distinctione octava ad decimam tertiam**, Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis, 2010, d. 10 p. 1 q. 1 (*Utrum possibile sit corpus Christi sub specie panis, et vini realiter contineri?*) n. 7-73 p. 56-76.

<sup>49</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, *Commentarii...* II d. 4 q. 3 p. 255 (“prima conclusio”).

Of the long series of conclusions to be found in his texts one should emphasize that the “formal reason” of quantity is the “extension of [its] parts” as quantitative, and its “formal effect” is to make substance “quantitative ou quantitatively extensive”. Again, Jerónimo Valera goes back to Scotist texts<sup>50</sup>. This is the first *ratio* of quantity, i.e. that quantity has “extension and parts”. That quantity has “extension and parts”, that means basically that a given quantity can be “divided quantitatively” in parts and can, therefore, be measured. Through quantitative parts, quantity or, as a consequence, a quantitative substance can occupy a place, and in that case each part is outside the place of the other, and moreover each part is impenetrable. Due to quantitative extension, a substance has “tangible parts”. Saying it in the right sequence of properties after the formal *ratio* of quantity: because of quantity, a substance can be *divided, measured, have local extension and impenetrability. Quantity is not defined* through “divisibility” (against Aristotle)<sup>51</sup> or “measurability” (against Aquinas, if one follows the interpretation of him given by Dominicus de Flandria (ca. 1425-1479))<sup>52</sup>. Furthermore, it is emphasized that quantitative extension (essential reason) *is not* extension in an order to a place, but rather in an “order to itself”. After all, the acceptance of the eucharistic mystery imposes the conclusion that quantity can be united to a substance “without local extension”. There, the body of Christ (quantitative substance) is not coextensive to the place (of the quantity of bread), but it is (nonetheless) “entire in the entire Host”, and it is “entire in every part” of the Host. And the body of Christ (quantitative substance) has the quantity (of the bread) that is the *subiectum quo* of perceived accidents. As a consequence, the body of Christ has “as much extension in an order to itself in the Host” as it has extension in heaven<sup>53</sup>.

<sup>50</sup> Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, V q. 9 n. 17-32 p. 532-535; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* IV d. 10 p. 1 q. 1 n. 42-55, 61-70 p. 66-70, 72-75.

<sup>51</sup> However, in: IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 16-17 n. 13-22 p. 395-397, and IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, V q. 9 n. 17-32 p. 532-535, the Subtle Doctor mentions explicitly “divisibilitas” as the *ratio* of quantity. Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 16-17 n. 13 p. 13: “Ideo dicitur aliter quod licet per se mensura conveniat quantitati, non tamen est illa ratio essentialis quantitatis secundum quod ei attribuitur ratio generis; sed ratio divisibilitatis. Et hoc de illa divisione quae est in partes eiusdem rationis”. Cfr. HAGER, F. P., Quantität I, in: RITTER, J. und GRÜNDER, K. (Hrsg.), **Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie**, Basel – Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co AG Verlag, Band 7, 1989, 1792-1794.

<sup>52</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 2 p. 255-256. Cfr. DOMINICUS DE FLANDRIA, **Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicae, seu Summa Divinae Philosophiae**, Coloniae Agrippinae: Typis Arnoldi Kempen, 1621, V q. 14 (*De distinctione multiplicatis ipsius quantitatis, et specierum eius*) a. 5 (*Utrum ratio mensura sit propria, et prima ratio quantitatis*) p. 301-302. Scotus considered measurability as *ratio* of quantity in IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, V q. 9 n. 8-16 p. 529-531.

<sup>53</sup> A consequence of Valera’s reasoning seems to be that a quantitative substance, just like a “body”, can be in two different places at the same time, for quantitative extension does not say “an order to a place”.



So, “the extension that the essence of quantity consists in is not in an order to a place, but in an order to itself”; that extensive quantity just says an order and position of parts within a quantitative whole<sup>54</sup>.

That the formal reason of quantity is to be (of itself and for itself) a quantitative extension – or extension of quantitative parts –, this is reinforced in two corollaries of II d. 4 q. 2. Mirroring a Scotist thesis<sup>55</sup>, Valera insists that quantity bestows the substance – in which quantity inheres – not only with the earlier already mentioned “intensity *ut quo*”<sup>56</sup>; the Peruvian master seems to affirm that quantity itself has quantity “in itself *ut quod*”, what amounts to say that, with priority, quantity itself is “quantitative”, extensive through parts”, “divisible” and “measurable”. Valera invokes Aristotle to propose a double sense of quantity as a predicament: *first*, a “*per se* and essential” *quantum*, which is quantity itself, as well as the kinds of quantity simply speaking<sup>57</sup>, which are “intrinsicly” (*ab intrinseco*) “quantitative items” (*quantae*); *second*, there is an “accidental *quantum*”, and instances of it are “substance” and “material accidents” such as “whiteness” and “blackness”, etc. Accordingly, one can realize that quantity has a priority “by nature” with respect to its “formal effect” of making substance (and any other inhering accident other than quantity) “quantitative”, “extensive”, “divisible”, etc.<sup>58</sup>. In fact, such aspects are intrinsic to quantity itself. Therefore, the following sentence is full of significance: “quantity is quantitative, extensive, continuous, *per se* and essential”. To extend in act to a given substance is inessential to quantity: it can subsist without it. All this follows from the reflections on substance and quantity provoked by the eucharistic mystery, in which the quantity of bread, being miraculously pre-

<sup>54</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 3 p. 256. On the introduction of the dogmatic meaning of the sacrament of the eucharist into the philosophical discussions on causality, substance and categories in general, cfr., for example, FORRAI, R. – GYÖRGY, G. – PERCZEL, I. (eds.), **The Eucharist in Theology and Philosophy. Issues of Doctrinal History in East and West from the Patristic Age to the Reformation**, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005, especially p. 209-315; cfr. more specifically YARNOLD, E., Transsubstantiation, in: FORRAI, R. – GYÖRGY, G. – PERCZEL, I. (eds.), **The Eucharist in Theology and Philosophy. Issues of Doctrinal History in East and West from the Patristic Age to the Reformation**, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005, p. 381-394 (especialmente p. 384-387). Cfr. above all ADAMS, M. Mc., **Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Gilles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 (especially Chapters 4-9; concerning Scotus, cfr. Chapters 5-6 and 9). Still on transsubstantiation and the real presence of Christ in Scotus’s approach, cfr. IAMARRONE, L., **Giovanni Duns Scoto – metafisico e teologo. Le tematiche fondamentali della sua filosofia e teologia**, Roma: Miscellanea Francescana, 1999, p. 730-743; CROSS, R., **Duns Scotus**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 139ff.

<sup>55</sup> Cfr. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 16-17 n. 13-22 p. 395-397.

<sup>56</sup> The passage (see footnote 57) brings some difficulties for interpretation; one gets the impression that Valera speaks here of that “intensive quantity” that opposes to “extensive quantity”.

<sup>57</sup> It may be the case that Valera means here intensive quantity and extensive quantity as a division that applies to quantity as such, and it applies also to the categorial realm, in the sense of covering it at least.

<sup>58</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 4 p. 256-257. Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 256: “Secundum est, quantitatem [...] non solum substantiae praefatam intensionem ut quo conferre, media unione ac informatione, sed eam in se ut quod habere, quam ob rem ipsam in se quanta, extensa, divisibilis, ac mensurabilis dicitur, [...], ob id Aristoteles solum in hoc praedicamento duplex quantum distinguit, unum per se et essenziale uti ipsa quantitas, ac illius species, quae ab intrinseco quantae dicuntur et non medio alio accidenti extrinseco, aliud quantum per accidens ut substantia et accidentia materialia, albedo, nigredo, etc.”.

served, is separated – through divine virtue – from the substance of the bread, that disappears<sup>59</sup>. Valera even conceives a very radical situation, in which neither substance nor any of its accidents in act would have extension. If something like that would happen through God's absolute power, quantity, being then preserved, would still have extension and parts of its own. According to that, to be “by nature” a quantitative extension or an extension of ordered quantitative parts is the formal *ratio* of quantity<sup>60</sup>.

We should note that the form how Valera determines the essential definition of quantity and the sequence of its properties, in spite of a substantial analysis of Scotist texts, combining contents from Scotus's Questions on the *Categories* and from Book V of the Questions on *Metaphysics*, contains a notorious difference. Valera sees in “being an extension of quantitative parts” the *ratio* of quantity, and in “divisibility” a property<sup>61</sup>. Scotus understands that “divisibility” is the *ratio* of quantity. For Jerónimo Valera, the following syllogism “would explain” the necessary property of divisibility: (MP) “Quantity is extension in quantitative parts”; (mP): “Extension in quantitative parts is divisible”; (C): “Therefore, quantity is divisible”. The logic, here, is in fact “Scotistic”. However, the further discussion and justification of this stance of Jerónimo Valera on the nature of the category of quantity will not be explored in this article<sup>62</sup>. It is important however to advise that Valera's treatment of such properties are both relevant to categorial quantity and to quantity in trans-categorial or transcendental sense as well. Valera believes that Aristotle did not expose sufficiently the properties of quantity<sup>63</sup>; moreover, fundamental properties of quantity are treated by Valera also considering *intensive quantity* – not only *extensive*

<sup>59</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 4 p. 257: “Tum quod prius convenit rei id quod est sibi intrinsecum et essenziale, quam quod extrinsecum est, habere autem extensionem ita est essenziale quantitati, ut sine illa intelligi nequeat, unde enunciatio haec quantitas est quanta, extensa, continua, est per se et essentialis, quando enim abstractum est de essentia subiecti, et ipsum concretum, cum ergo quantitas a qua sumitur concretum sit suamet essentia, esse quantum erit essenziale; extendere, vero actu substantiam, non est de essentia quantitatis, cum sine hoc non solum intelligi verum et in re dari possit, ut sacra Eucharistia convincit, [...]”.

<sup>60</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 4 p. 257: “[...], in qua quantitas quae a substantia panis separata conservatur, nullam substantiam extensam reddit, eademque virtute divina fieri posset, ut nullum accidens actu extenderet, sicut nec ullam substantiam, ipsa tamen in se extensa manet cum partibus, prius ergo convenit quantitati rationem esse partium sui ipsius, seu habere partes, quae suapte natura ordinantur ut substantiae formaliter impendantur”.

<sup>61</sup> It is a “proximate and first” property of quantity; cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 9 p. 279-280. Cfr. here *ibid.*, p. 280: “[...], et inter illas, proxima et immediata passio (ait noster Doctor) est divisibilitas, eo enim quod partes habet, immediate sequitur in eas divisibilem esse, unde quantitas per divisibilitatem ut per proximam et primam illius passionem notificatur, non deffinitur, hanc sequitur finitas vel infinitas, cum finitum praesupponat aliquid quod finiri debet, quod necessario divisibile praeintelligitur, [...]”.

<sup>62</sup> For this discussion, cfr. PICH, R. H., Jerónimo Valera (1568–1625) sobre ente infinito, infinitude e quantidade, *op. cit.*, p. 259-262.

<sup>63</sup> Cfr. HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 9 p. 277.

*quantity* –, in a clear attempt of combining Aristotle’s insights on intensities and Scotus’s explicit contributions on that matter<sup>64</sup>.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Methodologically, it is important to realize how much Valera combines, for the purpose of explaining the themes of Duns Scotus’s *logicalia* and of proposing a philosophy of logic *lato sensu*, resources to be found in the entire *opera* of the Subtle Doctor, especially *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* and *Ordinatio* I. For several important notions towards a theory of real concepts and classifications of reality, Valera feels committed to introduce reflections on metaphysics and crosses the borders of a categorial logic by introducing discussions on transcendental notions such as infinity, intrinsic modes, (pure) perfections and the division of intensive and extensive quantity. Unfortunately, the course on metaphysics that Valera presumably dictated<sup>65</sup> did not come to us – as far as we know. Even if we confine our analysis to a more conservative logic of categories, Valera shows unmistakable intellectual power of determining, with some originality and good amount of personal subtlety, the correct doctrine of saying being, as in his analysis of the *ratio* of quantity. If his account is pressed by theological points of view – namely the challenging of defining quantity by reflecting on the philosophical implications of assuming a given theory of the eucharist –, this amounts, to say the least, to a significant enlargement of our habits of conceiving.

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<sup>64</sup> Cfr., for example, HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** II d. 4 q. 9 p. 277, and p. 278-279.

<sup>65</sup> We get firm impressions on Valera’s allegedly existing course on metaphysics from several passages in which he feels compelled to treat only “with brevity” metaphysical topics, which he would supposedly treat extensively in another moment and text; cfr., above all, HYERONIMUS VALERA, **Commentarii...** I d. 2 a. 1 p. 34 (Commentarium): “Materia haec [De natura universalis in communi] difficilis est, et diffusa, nos tamen ut clariori methodo procedamus, brevitatem amplectentes quaestiones Metaphysicas summis tantum (ut dicunt) labiis degustabimus, ut mediocri illarum cognitione instructi, quae necessaria sunt ad universalium intelligentiam percipiamus, sicque pedetentim tyrones nostri procedant ad ea, quae in nostra Metaphysica latius sumus disputaturi”. Cfr also **Commentarii...** I d. 1 q. 4 p. 9; I d. 2 a. 2 q. 1 p. 52ss.; II d. 4 q. 4 p. 262.

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